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Summary 
China’s potential transition to a low-carbon, climate resilient or ‘post-carbon’ society is a key concern 
for the world. There is an urgent need for better understanding of this process, posing major challenges 
for social science given the complex, systemic and emergent nature of the multiple processes involved 
in such a possible transition. This Working Paper is the first of a series of four 'China Low Carbon 
Reports' outlining the STEPS-Centre affiliate project 'Low Carbon Innovation in China: Prospects, 
Politics and Practice', led from Lancaster University.  The project is designed around problem-led social 
scientific research involving partners from leading UK and Chinese institutions.  It aims to assess the 
status of, and opportunities for, low-carbon transitions in China by going beyond existing technology-
focused approaches to innovation. In particular, this involves a re-insertion and reconceptualisation of 
power within the processes of low-carbon transitions, conceived as processes of socio-technical 
systems, and with greater attention paid to everyday social practices of both ‘users’ and producers. 
Through this distinct approach, the project offers empirical, methodological and theoretical 
contributions to the study of (low-carbon) socio-technical transitions both in China and more broadly. 
The paper outlines the background to this project, the urgency of deeper and more productive 
understanding of the prospects of low-carbon transition in China, and the theoretical and 
methodological approaches adopted to do this. 
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1. Overview  
China’s potential transition to a low-carbon, climate resilient or ‘post-carbon’ (Urry 2011) society is a 
key concern for the world. There is an urgent need for better understanding of this process, posing 
major challenges for social science given the complex, systemic and emergent nature of the multiple 
processes involved in such a possible transition. This Working Paper introduces an ESRC-funded project 
'Low-carbon Innovation in China: Prospects, Politics and Practice', designed around problem-led social 
scientific research involving partners from leading UK and Chinese institutions.1  This project aims to 
assess the status of, and opportunities for, low-carbon transitions in China by going beyond existing 
technology-focused approaches to innovation. In particular, this involves a re-insertion and 
reconceptualisation of power within the processes of low-carbon transitions, conceived as processes 
of socio-technical systems, and with greater attention paid to everyday social practices of both ‘users’ 
and producers. Through this distinct approach, the project offers empirical, methodological and 
theoretical contributions to the study of (low-carbon) socio-technical transitions both in China and 
more broadly. 
First, we outline the importance of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) within the global challenge of 
climate change mitigation, demonstrating the need for greater understanding of the processes 
through which China might transition towards lower carbon pathways of development.  Second, we 
provide a brief overview of both the policies that have deployed, and literature that has investigated, 
‘innovation’ – conceived at various levels – as a potential response to this challenge. Specifically we 
examine Chinese narratives, policies and targets that have linked the country’s focus on technological 
innovation to its environmental objectives.  Third, we identify and investigate two aspects of the 
Chinese story that have remained relatively neglected in previous analyses of low-carbon innovation 
(as opposed, say, to climate policy more generally (Heggelund et al. 2010; Hallding et al. 2011). These 
are, first, the importance of politics and power, conceived in terms of strategic and productive power 
relations, and of China’s particular governance context in low-carbon transitions, and second, the 
significance of social practices where previously the demand side of innovations, their reception and 
consumption, have been largely neglected. From here, we outline the overall methodology of the 
project, including its design around three research packages, each of which studies two different 
‘pathways’ of systemic change associated with specific low-carbon innovations (Leach et al. 2010).  The 
final section describes the potential insights that the project design and methodology should deliver 
and especially its implications for low-carbon innovation practice and policy in the UK, China and 
elsewhere. 
  
                                                          
1 The project’s Chinese partners are Tsinghua University (Dr WANG Yu), Graduate School at Shenzhen, Tsinghua University 
(Dr LI Ping) and the Chinese Centre for Agricultural Policy of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (Dr SONG Yiching).  We are 
grateful to all our Chinese partners for their discussion, which has fed into this Working Paper, and to ESRC for funding this 
work (project ES/K006002/1). 
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2. The Environment and Climate Change Challenge in China: a 
Global Issue 
Scientific studies of climate change and other planetary boundaries (Rockström et al. 2009) suggest 
ecological limits to current forms of development, demanding systemic changes at a global level (Leach 
et al. 2012). Yet in 2014, we see little evidence of the systemic transformations needed to mitigate 
climate change and to deal with other environmental crises. Fossil energy use is associated with many 
negative environmental effects, including global climate change. Yet around 80 per cent of the global 
primary energy supply is still derived from burning fossil fuels, oil, gas and coal (Berners-Lee and Clark 
2013; IEA 2014). 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2013:7) warned that:  
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide have increased to 
levels unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years. CO2 concentrations have increased by 
40 per cent since pre-industrial times, primarily from fossil fuel emissions and secondarily from 
net land use change emissions.  
Energy use from burning fossil fuels contributes directly to greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions which in 
turn seems to generate rising temperatures and other observed effects. According to the IPCC the 
global mean surface temperature rose by 0.85°C ± 0.2°C between 1880 and 2012 (IPCC 2013). This has 
been particularly significant over the last 50 years. The IPCC reports that on a global level they found 
high increases in heavy precipitation events, more frequent droughts (especially in the (sub)tropics), 
changes in the large-scale atmospheric circulation and increases in tropical cyclone activity since the 
1970s (IPCC 2013; IPCC 2014). The IPCC’s latest Fifth Assessment Report highlights the observed and 
partly irreversible changes to the earth’s ecosystems, particularly the changes to the oceans, which 
absorb a large part of the CO2 and thereby become acidified, and the cryosphere (IPCC 2013; IPCC 
2014; Urban 2014). 
Today, the majority of climate scientists agree that 'the possibility of staying below the 2o Celsius 
threshold by 2100 between “acceptable” and “dangerous” climate change becomes less likely as no 
serious global action on climate change is taken' (Urban and Nordensvärd 2013:4; Tyndall Centre 2009; 
Richardson et al. 2009; Urban et al. 2009; Urry 2011; Urban et al. 2011. 
Climate scientists estimate that for a 50 per cent chance of limiting temperature rises to this 2oC target, 
a global atmospheric CO2 equivalent concentration of 400 to 450 ppm must not be exceeded. And yet 
the 400 ppm target was recently exceeded and emissions are still rising (Richardson et al. 2009; Tans 
and Keeling 2013). Emissions must in fact be reduced very rapidly at a global level to have a reasonable 
chance of avoiding dangerous climate change (Urban 2014; Carrington 2013) and there has to be a 
rapid downturn of emissions across the globe (see calculations in Berners-Lee and Clark 2013). Most 
of the fossil fuels lying under the ground or the seas must be left there and not burnt. This has very 
major implications for corporations and states that believed that most of that fossil fuel energy would 
indeed get to be burnt and turned into profit (see Carbon Tracker 2013, on dire economic implications). 
Other major environmental (and societal) issues that are linked to high carbon development pathways 
are air pollution, resource depletion and peak oil. 
China is absolutely central to developing low-carbon transitions (Urban et al. 2009; Urban 2014; Wang 
and Watson 2009). Energy demand increased with the country’s unprecedented economic growth, 
averaging 10 per cent p.a. for 30 years, so that with its high dependence on coal – China’s coal-fired 
power sector is the world’s largest single anthropogenic source of CO2 emissions (Harris 2010) – China 
is now the world’s largest energy user and absolute carbon dioxide emitter (IEA 2013). Energy use, 
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production and CO2 emissions have increased rapidly in China since its economic reforms. CO2 
emissions increased from 876,633kt in 1970 to 8,286,892kt in 2010, more than a nine-fold increase 
(World Bank 2014; IEA 2014). The rate of increase was particularly high between 2000 and 2010. 
Similar developments have been observed in total energy use, production has increased from 
394,149kt of oil equivalent in 1970 to 2,262,039kt of oil equivalent in 2010, an almost six-fold increase 
(World Bank 2014; IEA 2014; see Urry 2013: Chapter 6 on the dramatic increases in oil consumption 
within contemporary China). Figures 2.1 to 2.4 show how dramatically China’s energy production, 
electricity production and CO2 emissions have increased in recent decades. 
Figure 2.1: Energy production between 1970 and 2010 in China 
 
Sources: World Bank 2014 and IEA 2014 
 
Figure 2.2: Electricity production between 1970 and 2010 in China 
 
Sources: World Bank 2014 and IEA 2014 
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Figure 2.3: CO2 emissions between 1970 and 2010 in China 
 
Sources: World Bank 2014 and IEA 2014 
Figure 2.4: Total volume of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use and cement production for selected countries, 1000 
million tonnes of CO2, 1990-2012 
 
Source: Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 
It is often suggested that per capita energy use and per capita CO2 emissions are low in China compared 
with high-income countries. But while China had low per capita figures for energy use and emissions 
for a long period, it has been catching up more recently. China’s per capita CO2 emissions are 
increasingly comparable with those of the European Union (EU), while in Europe they have been 
somewhat declining since the mid-1990s and were 7.3 tonnes CO2 per capita in 2010. In China, by 
contrast, they have steadily increased and risen to 6.2 tonnes by 2010 (World Bank 2014; IEA 2014).  
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Most recently, in September 2014 on the eve of the New York Climate Conference it was announced 
that China’s per capita emissions exceeded the EU’s for the first time in 2013 (Financial Times 2014).  
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show how per capita energy use increased in China over the past few decades, 
particularly in the last few years. Figure 2.7 compares Chinese per capita emissions with those of 
industrialised societies, illustrating particularly clearly the convergence in China’s and Europe’s per 
capita CO2 emissions.  
Figure 2.5: Energy use per capita between 1970 and 2010 in China 
 
Sources: Data from World Bank 2014; IEA 2014 
 
Figure 2.6: CO2 emissions per capita between 1970 and 2010 in China 
 
Sources: World Bank 2014; IEA 2014 
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Figure 2.7: CO2 emissions per capita between 1970 and 2010 among selected emitters, tonnes CO2 per capita 
 
Source: World Bank 2014 
China’s historic emissions are lower than many high-income countries, notably the States (US). The 
World Resources Institute (WRI) concluded in 2005 that about 75 per cent of global climate change 
was due to the historical contribution of developed countries (Baumart et al. 2005; Hansen 2011). But 
taking into account the rise in energy use and emissions in China over the past decade, this picture is 
changing fast, with some arguing that China’s cumulative emissions will be the highest of any country 
within 10 to 20 years (Stavins 2014).  
This debate is complicated, however, by the question of the proportion of China’s CO2 emissions that 
are in fact due to manufacturing goods not for Chinese consumption but for export to higher income 
societies, particularly the US and Europe. One study found that 25 per cent of China’s emissions in fact 
resulted from the export of high amounts of manufactured goods moved in vast container ships to 
high-income countries (Wang and Watson 2007; Pan et al. 2009). There is thus an offshoring of 
emissions from advanced economies to China, an issue significant in negotiations at the 2009 United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Copenhagen Climate Change 
Conference. Some, though, further argue that decreasing or flatlining emissions and energy use within 
industrialised societies, especially after the financial crisis of 2007/8, may begin to change this pattern 
(see Figure 2.7, as well as Urry (2014) on the possibilities of 'reshoring' manufacturing through 
developing 3D printing). Whatever position one may take, therefore, regarding the contested 
distribution of responsibility and even 'blame' for growing global GHG emissions (Harris 2011), such is 
the size of China and the rate of its economic growth that all such debates are rapidly becoming moot, 
if still, understandably, heated on both sides, while a clear and undeniable conclusion emerges in their 
stead, that Chinese GHG emissions must be tackled (in some way and by many agencies) as a global 
matter of urgency.   
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3. Innovation as a Response 
Globally, the discourse of innovation has been put forward as a major way of 'fixing' climate change 
alongside broader arguments for developing 'sustainability-oriented innovation systems' (Altenburg 
and Pegels 2012).  Similar themes have been adopted in discussions of the 'entrepreneurial state' 
(Mazzucato 2013), which stress the vital role of governments, not only in driving R&D investment in 
strategic green sectors, but also in constructing a market for innovation and in building the skilled 
workforce required to serve emerging areas of eco-innovation.  The rapid socio-economic 
development in China offers unparalleled opportunities for systems-changing low-carbon innovations 
(Berkhout et al. 2011), a possibility that dovetails with a drive for increased ‘indigenous’ or 
‘independent’ innovation in order to build competitiveness and growth (Jakobson 2007; Schwaag-
Serger and Breidne 2007; Wilsdon and Keeley 2007).   
According to numerous metrics of science and innovation, China’s innovation performance is growing 
at an extraordinary pace (Gao and Guan 2009; Royal Society 2011; Hu 2011). China has already 
overtaken the EU regarding the share of its economy devoted to R&D. According to the OECD, in 2012 
China invested 1.98 per cent of its GDP in R&D, compared with 1.96 per cent for the 28 member states 
of the EU (Van Noorden 2014). While some argue such measures have limited impact on actual 
innovation performance and productivity growth (Comin 2004; Lane 2009; Ejermo et al. 2011), they 
still receive policy attention in the UK (Bound et al. 2013) and elsewhere, and are the result of intense 
policy efforts to build an 'innovation-based economy' in China. China’s President Xi Jinping was 
reported by state news agency Xinhua in 2013 to have said, 'the fundamental approach to breaking up 
the bottleneck restriction on China's economic development was through innovation and technology' 
(Xinhua 2013). In 2014, in a speech to the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and Chinese Academy 
of Engineering (CAE), Xi stated that, 'the direction of China's science and technology development is 
“innovation, innovation and innovation”', and noted that, 'independent innovation [should be the] 
essence [of a strategy to] free up the huge potentials of science and technology’ (Xinhua 2014). 
According to this strategy, globally competitive capacities for innovation should move the Chinese 
economy beyond its current role as the low-cost workshop of the world (OECD 2008; Schwaag-Serger 
and Breidne 2007) so that greater economic gains would accrue to Chinese companies.  
There is also now a large and rapidly growing literature on low-carbon innovation in China that 
documents impressive developments regarding renewable technologies such as wind energy, solar 
photovoltaics, hydropower and electric vehicles (EVs).  Much of the earlier literature was generated 
by International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs), consultancies and intergovernmental 
organisations (Climate Group 2009; Pew Environment Group 2010; Boston Consulting Group 2011; 
McKinsey Global Institute 2008). It is characterised by a relatively narrow focus on the supply side of 
the innovation system and developing improvements in manufacturing individual technologies. 
Scholars have, more recently, begun to adopt an innovation systems perspective to investigate the 
role of policies, firm strategies and university led R&D in building China’s eco-innovation capabilities.  
In some cases authors have questioned how quickly the country’s firms can come to a position of 
dominance, describing the journey towards eco-innovation leadership as a ‘hard slog’ rather than a 
‘leapfrog’ (Rock et al. 2009).  
Lema and Lema (2012) as well as Lewis (2013) analysed the shift from conventional 'technology 
transfer' to joint ventures and technology acquisition by Chinese (and Indian) firms in the wind energy 
industry and, working with other colleagues, Lema analysed in detail how Chinese wind power firms 
impacted on global value chains by component suppliers (Lema et al. 2013).  Drawing on technological 
innovation systems approaches Bergek and Gosens (Bergek et al. 2008; Gosens et al. 2013) 
investigated learning in clean-tech innovation and Quitzow (2013) compared the co-evolution of 
policy, market and the solar photovoltaic (PV) industry within Germany and China.  Fischer (2012; 
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2014) has provided fascinating accounts of the technology, policy and political barriers and challenges 
that characterised the Chinese PV sector, while Dai (2014) conducted political analyses of wind energy 
policy at national and local levels of government. 
These studies have significantly built upon earlier work and explain the processes behind China’s 
increasing capabilities within some elements of low-carbon innovation.  Whilst they provide insights 
into the politics of innovation policy, they still focus primarily on production and industry, or attend to 
consumption and reception of innovations from an economic perspective of market demand and/or 
market failure.  As such, while they provide a good basis for understanding industrial development in 
these strategic sectors, with a few exceptions, they engage less with political and sociological questions 
of transition that are especially pertinent from a systems perspective (see below).  Work in innovation 
studies points to the importance of these demand processes for understanding the character and 
potential development of low-carbon transition, where these are conceived not as shifts in markets 
for specific technologies but as socio-technical systems. This, in turn, opens up the need to consider 
how to develop, not just a low-carbon technology or economy, but a much broader low-carbon 
‘economy-and-society’. 
Literature from science, technology and innovation studies has drawn upon historical case studies to 
describe and analyse previous socio-technical transitions (Schot et al. 1994; Geels 2002; Elzen et al. 
2004; Smith et al. 2005; Dennis and Urry 2009). This has developed into an emerging field guiding much 
academic and policy thinking around the challenge of ‘decarbonisation’ (Van den Berg et al. 2011). 
Whilst recognising its limitations (Smith et al. 2010), the ‘multi-level perspective’ or MLP (Geels 2002), 
has become the most widely adopted version of this at least within European literature.  
The MLP describes three levels: the incumbent socio-technical regime or system; a set of emergent 
‘niches’ that are attempting to unsettle this system and perhaps even generate the discontinuity that 
leads to a broader system transition; and an exogenous level or ‘landscape’ of what may be taken as 
relatively stable background factors, such as the broader political economy, ecology and geopolitics. 
Under this framework, the assemblage of heterogeneous elements (science, culture, technology, 
policy, industry, markets, user preferences), each with its own specific history, constitutes a socio-
technical regime characterising the dominant sectoral configuration at any time. These regimes can be 
self-reinforcing through processes of ‘technological momentum’ (Hughes 2000), ‘entrapment’ (Walker 
2000) or ‘lock-in’ (Unruh 2000), so creating situations in which individual corporations or 
entrepreneurs are highly constrained in their potential to ‘disrupt’.   
The tendency for socio-technical and environmental systems to reinforce a given direction or 
directions of change is also articulated in the pathways approach of the STEPS Centre, which adds to 
the traditions above by highlighting the role of politics and power in projecting dominant framings 
onto narratives that enable, constrain or signpost specific directions of system change (Leach et al. 
2010). This approach allows for analysis of multiple niche-level alternatives in contrast to the dominant 
pathway (which would be referred to in the MLP as the regime).  
The multi-level perspective describes how, through processes of niche accumulation and regime 
destabilisation (Turnheim and Geels 2012) and pressure from a higher ‘landscape’ level, these different 
components of the socio-technical regime become reconfigured in a way that, in turn, affects the form 
and dynamic transformation of each element. From this perspective, then, it is immediately apparent 
that neither new technology (supply) nor market forces (demand) alone will affect the kinds of system 
innovation necessary for low-carbon transition. Central here is understanding the complex nature of 
the innovation processes. There are crucial ‘instabilities’ or ‘ambivalences’ of technologies, most of 
which do not have a single, pure and unambiguous effect. Technologies may move around and exert a 
range of intended and unintended consequences as they become lodged within one or another system 
that are themselves in process and not inevitable or pre-determined in their consequences.  
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Thus what is involved is not just specific isolated technologies (and their sources of consumer demand) 
but rather new socio-technical systems that incorporate multiple self-sustaining, stabilizing and 
interacting processes that may generate distinct pathways of change. For instance, Dennis and Urry 
(2009) examine the many contingencies in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century 
that were implicated in developing what is now known as the car-system, even including how there 
were three potential energy sources for this possible system, based on coal, oil and battery-power. 
Indeed innovations can emerge unexpectedly from the left-field, from experimenters, NGOs or 
alternative groups (as with the late nineteenth century car system). Also, what is important is not the 
individual innovation per se, but the processes which over time synchronise a range of, often diverse, 
innovations generated within different industries across societies. In system change new technologies 
get combined with new or reconfigured combinations of elements. New systems form, often deriving 
from apparently unconnected innovations initiated within diverse, geographically distant locations 
(this is elaborated in Urry 2011: Chapter 8).  
Most significantly, innovations are part of, and transform, social practices and institutions, hence they 
are ‘sociotechnical’. Innovations are social in three ways. First, the social ties or networked relations 
between multiple innovators are highly significant. Resulting innovations stem from networks which 
are often globalised and not from individual ‘geniuses’ (see Birtchnell et al. 2013 for a social network 
analysis of 3D printing).  Second, innovations presuppose transformations in underlying social 
practices. Examples include daily showering, the weekly shop, the school run, the annual conference, 
the foreign holiday, buying and eating food without regard to the seasons and so on (Shove et al. 2012). 
Many innovations remain as specialist niches, with only a handful developing into wider system 
changes if they are taken up, synchronised and gain (possibly global) traction as new social practices 
are engendered and sedimented. Arthur (2009) argues that:  
A revolution does not arrive until we reorganize our activities […] around its technologies, and 
until those technologies adapt themselves to us. For this to happen, the new domain must 
gather adherents and prestige. It must find purposes and uses…This time is likely to be decades, 
not years. And during this time the old technology lives on.  
Arthur 2009: 157 
See also Edgerton (2006) on this point.  
Central considerations here are the mass/social media, changing patterns of global governance, the 
social science of fashion, and different forms of everyday life within which such innovations may 
contingently be enfolded.  
Finally, system innovations must be driven by new social power relations, political identities and 
coalitions and associated social inclusions and exclusions. In this way, a transition may develop 
momentum that underpins further social change, innovation and new power relations in complex 
positive feedback loops. Key here is the issue of power, and in relation to developing low-carbonism, 
particularly the mobilising interests of ‘carbon capital’. This power centre typically lobbies against 
regulation and intervention in energy markets and energy prospecting; bends foreign policies and 
military interventions to its interests; undermines some post-carbon innovation; funds various 
foundations and think-tanks to ‘merchandise doubt’; denies the finite nature of carbon resources and 
the anthropogenic nature of global warming, and; undermines mass transit alternatives (Oreskes and 
Conway 2010; Urry 2011: Chapter 6).  However, even these well-resourced efforts are not uniformly 
successful, and understanding how they succeed or fail is a crucial element of understanding the 
politics of low-carbon transition.  Nonetheless, it is still the case that carbon capital is along, with 
finance, the world’s most powerful interest and it will be hard for any new system to emerge without 
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it either being somehow implicated or possibly side-lined through the development emerging left-field, 
such as in China.  
Moreover, according to Arthur the process of ‘combination’ or assemblage of disparate elements that 
may lead to a new system typically takes three to four decades (Arthur 2009). Likewise Nye (2014) 
argues that previous regime changes usually took forty or more years and, very significantly, did not 
involve the direct substitution of one energy source for another. Observations from historic energy 
transitions have shown that most transitions were rather slow, lasting several decades or even more 
than a century (Smil 2010; Solomon and Krishna 2011).  A new regime involves reorganising society 
over decades, including its transportation system, population distribution and the nature of work and 
especially of forms of social practice (Nye 2014).  
This conception of system innovation and socio-technical transition thus strongly suggests that low-
carbon transition will depend significantly on transition, not just in supply-side energy technologies, 
but also in the social forms that instantiate the reception and consumption of specific low-carbon 
innovations and are thereby co-produced with low-carbon technological trajectories.  Moreover, in 
the case of a transformation of the fundamental systems of modern life of fossil fuel use (Tyfield and 
Urry 2014) and particularly locked-in systems such as internal combustion engine (ICE) based 
automobility (Geels et al. 2013: xiii), the imperviousness of such transition to understanding in terms 
of ‘technology’ and ‘markets’ is particularly striking.   
This perspective also offers considerable resources for understanding low-carbon transition in China. 
Yet studying transitions in China requires analysis of two areas that have been absent from most 
(international) research in that country. These are the specific socio-political aspects of system 
innovation and, within that, the transformation of specific social practices, such as eating particular 
lower carbon foods, changed levels of comfort/energy use in the home and the emergence of lower 
carbon mobility-based social practices.  In this project, therefore, we take into account China’s 
distinctive political economic system, the diverse and distributed range of actors enabling low-carbon 
innovation to emerge and the political processes through which power relations are contingently co-
produced with, creating and reinforcing, potential low-carbon innovation trajectories.   
In relation to the above, we examine the changing nature of environmental politics in China and the 
governance shifts that afford an increasing role for Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) within a 
traditionally authoritarian system.  Turning away from the top-down perspective on development of 
low-carbon technologies and the obstacles to their widespread dispersion (e.g. World Bank/DRC 2012), 
we take seriously the non-technological elements of system change, including importantly lower 
carbon social practices.  Thus we avoid simply accepting a definition of innovation that overwhelmingly 
informs low-carbon policy, focused exclusively on high-technology, intellectual property (IP)-intensive 
R&D led by major corporations and research institutes. Instead we expand our purview to include 
wider forms of innovation such as new business models in small firms and NGOs, as well as changes in 
social practices, and how these different models are articulated in specific domains. We explore these 
two research challenges in the next section. 
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4. ‘Politics’ and ‘Practice’: Neglected Areas in Chinese Low-Carbon 
Innovation 
Under the headings ‘politics and power’ and ‘practice’, we illustrate the relevance and centrality of 
these two broad sets of issues that are relatively understudied in analyses of potential low-carbon 
transitions in China. 
4.1. Politics and Power 
It is first necessary to examine the crucial issue of China’s particular socio-political context. The PRC’s 
history of environmental problems and approaches varies widely, from the Maoist era, when 
numerous projects affecting the environment, such as hastily built dams and land reclamation 
schemes, were carried out with what Shapiro (2001) described as ‘utopian urgency’ and ‘dogmatic 
uniformity’, to China’s eventual participation in the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment in Stockholm in 1972. This was a turning point that led to the establishment of the 
country’s first national environment agency, which later became the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection.  
Since then, China’s centralised and integrated national Five-Year Plans (FYPs) have played a key role, 
not only in setting the country’s key strategic, economic and innovation priorities, but also in 
environmental initiatives. In the first decades of the People’s Republic, FYPs emphasised ever-higher 
production targets in industries such as coal and steel. However, by the Sixth FYP (1981–1985), at the 
start of China’s Reform Era, FYPs would also include energy conservation efforts. Around the same 
time China passed the first of its environmental laws and regulations, including the Environmental 
Protection Law (1979) and the Water Pollution Law (1984). The Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996–2000) was 
the first to include the term 'sustainable development' (Geall and Pellisery 2012), and in 1997, the 
Fifteeenth Party Congress listed the, ‘huge environmental and resource pressures caused by 
population growth and economic development’, as major difficulties facing the Chinese population 
(Meng 2012). 
China published the first national climate-change plan of any developing country in 2007. This 
formalised China’s commitment to addressing climate-change mitigation and adaptation, while also 
upholding the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ and integrating climate change 
into other policies for national and social economic development, thus establishing that climate 
policies do not take priority over other national objectives (Harris 2010). Climate change is also 
emphasised in the Twelth Five-Year Plan (for 2011–15) (NDRC 2011; Ng 2011), which lists seven 
strategic emerging industries for support, including environmental protection and energy efficiency, 
new energy, biotechnology and clean-energy vehicles (some of which will be investigated in this 
project), and pledges a reduction in energy consumption per unit of GDP (energy intensity) by 16 per 
cent, a carbon intensity reduction of 17 per cent and a target for non-fossil fuel to account for 11.4 per 
cent of primary energy consumption. It also established the Top-10,000 Energy-Consuming Enterprises 
Programme, which aims to save energy among enterprises that use more than 10,000 tonnes of coal 
equivalent per year and transportation companies, public buildings, hotels and commercial enterprises 
consuming more than 5,000 tonnes of coal equivalent per year. 
Throughout, China remained a one-party (although supposedly multi-party), nominally Communist 
state. However, its economy has been transformed dramatically, and is today characterised as a 
variant of state capitalism (Breznitz and Murphree 2011; Huang 2008; Naughton 2011; Tsai 2007; Keith 
et al. 2013). Although privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has proceeded apace since the 
1990s (WB/DRC 2012), the political economic domination of major SOE national champions and the 
associated ‘cadre-capitalist alliance’ (So 2003) of top party-state leaders and SOE managers has 
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‘reached a new peak in recent years’ (Zhang 2011: 148). In 2009, the total profits of two giant SOEs 
(Sinopec and China Mobile) were larger than those of the largest 500 private companies (Li 2011:13). 
State-owned companies account for 80 per cent of the stock market, including the three largest 
companies by revenues (all in the Global Fortune top ten). Nominally ‘private’ companies, especially 
national champions, are closely connected with state institutions.  
Key questions for China’s low-carbon transition are the strengths and weaknesses of this state 
capitalist approach and the extent to which it is capable of acting as an ‘entrepreneurial state’ 
(Mazzucato 2013). Since 2006, the Central Government, as buyer and seller in key industries, has 
introduced stringent, complex and fast-changing regulations on high-tech foreign enterprises 
mandating high local-content requirements and transfer of proprietary technologies (Hout and 
Ghemawat 2010).  Through a suite of policies and investments that have created an ‘absorptive state’ 
(Bound et al. 2013), the country has managed to build (or acquire) world-leading firms in strategic 
green sectors such as manufacturing solar panels and wind turbines (Lema and Lema 2012; Schmitz 
2013).  
Beyond the production of such hi-tech products, however, the potential for nurturing low-carbon 
innovation in large firms to translate to wider low-carbon transitions is an open question, a distinction 
that again presupposes an understanding of innovation that goes beyond the techno-economic 
orthodoxy.  For such innovation capacity requires attention beyond such firms to a wider range of 
actors, including so-called users.  It also requires analysis of the implementation of such plans, policies 
and models, which should be understood in the context of the complex dynamics of China’s 
environmental governance and governmentality (Economy 2005; Edin 2003; Wang 2013).   
Crucial here is that China’s structure of state power relations is, in fact, far from monolithic and 
ruthlessly efficient.  The literature on China’s environmental governance notes, for example, the 
horizontal fragmentation created by the proliferation of competing and overlapping decision-making 
bodies at an elite level. While in theory, China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) is the 
highest central government institution regulating the environment, other organisations often take the 
lead on particular environmental issues. Chinese environmental governance is thus characterised by 
‘fragmented authoritarianism’ (Lieberthal 1992; Mertha 2009) with protracted bargaining between 
bureaucratic units, including ministries, advisory bodies and top-level ‘National Leading Groups’ 
specifically established to coordinate cross-jurisdictional issues. Other ministries beyond MEP that play 
a key role for low-carbon innovation include the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), Ministry 
of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM), Ministry of Transport (MOT), the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) as well as the powerful 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) which decides for example about the medium- 
and long-term plans for renewable energy (Urban et al. 2012). 
Furthermore, such horizontal fragmentation is also matched by vertical fragmentation. The 
considerable devolution of power to the provinces and localities, first introduced in the early Reform 
Era, has created a complex arrangement often described by the Chinese metaphor tiao kuai (‘branches 
and lumps’) where central government authorities lack the capacity to demand enforcement of 
environmental laws and policies at the local level. Under China’s relatively decentralised approach, 
local environmental bureaus, for example, are funded by local governments, rather than the MEP, 
meaning they tend to act in the interests of those very institutions they are tasked with regulating (see 
also Harrison and Kostka 2012; Teng 2012).  This includes SOEs who may often be of higher rank in the 
complicated political hierarchy and/or have greater political resources at their disposal.   
For instance, SOE reform has granted SOEs (especially major national SOEs) greater managerial 
autonomy from the party-state. However, this has to a great extent simply inverted the relations of 
influence, rather than created arm’s-length institutional relations (Jiang forthcoming; Zhao 2010).  
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With senior Party figures still passing through senior management positions on their rise through the 
ranks, and with great fortunes of personal wealth to be made, often through borderline or even 
outright corruption, the situation today can be one approximating ‘state capture’ by these SOEs, rather 
than ‘corporate capture’ by the party-state (Dickson 2008; Tsai 2007).  The politics of EV transition are 
thus intimately related to the broader socio-political challenges of a powerful cadre-capitalist class (So 
2003).  Furthermore, and more prosaically, economic targets often mean that local officials are 
rewarded politically by central government for achieving GDP growth, even if it comes at the expense 
of the local environment.  
Chinese observers of the effects of this decentralisation also note the extent to which a ‘project 
system’ (Tian 2014; Qu 2012) logic has been instituted across government at all levels, a ‘governance 
model between the traditional system and market mechanisms’ (Tian 2014: 1) where local 
governments compete for projects to attract special funding from central government (Qu 2012: 10). 
In the field of low-carbon innovation, one finds an illustration of these dynamics in central government 
plans around urbanisation, where cities dedicated to low-carbon development and electric mobility 
have been ‘identified and encouraged to compete for solutions’ (Fischer 2012: 5). While the 
‘ideological foundation’ of such a system is technocratic (Tian 2014: 3), its ‘expert rationality’ often 
acts instead as ‘cover for sectoral interests and interest groups’. 'In practice', writes Kelly (2014: 57) 
such an arrangement, ‘produces governance that sits uncomfortably half-way between full-scale 
planning signed off by ministers and the flexibility and canny differentiation of the market.’  
Furthermore, non-governmental actors, institutions and discourses have greater sway over decision-
making around environment, climate change and innovation policies than in previous periods. Over 
the past 15 years, many influential officials and policymakers at the central level have supported citizen 
oversight, media coverage and other forms of public participation by civil society in order to improve 
local enforcement of environmental regulations in the context of waning ‘legitimacy’ (Wang 2013). 
Regime legitimacy and performance legitimacy are concepts widely discussed and understood in 
Chinese policymaking, and are significant in driving reforms towards new cadre evaluation systems, as 
well as the introduction of laws and regulations such as the Environmental Impact Assessment Law 
(EIA) (2002) and transparency initiatives on open environmental information and innovations such as 
Hotline 12369. The last of these is a phone tip-off line for citizens to report pollution incidents and 
environmental violations and is operated by the MEP (CCICED 2013).  
While many institutional procedures for such public participation are vague and poorly enforced, and 
environmental advocacy is closely monitored and subject to periodic crackdowns (Geall and Hilton 
2014), green NGOs have proliferated, and there are now 492,000 legally registered social organisations 
in China, according to a 2012 government report, of which many are green. Concerns about 
environmental issues have increased among China’s newly empowered middle class(es) (e.g. Li 2010; 
Goodman 2014), with opinions expressed more freely and rapidly than ever before due to increasingly 
ubiquitous social media and messaging technologies. Urban protests increasingly focus around the lack 
of transparency and accountability concerning potentially polluting developments (Ansfield 2013; Tang 
2013; CCICED 2013; Geall and Hilton 2014), and according to some in the Chinese Government, they 
represent the most common catalyst for ‘mass incidents’ or protests (Bloomberg 2013).  
4.2. Bringing Power into Transition Studies 
Beyond incorporating an understanding of the Country’s environmental politics and governance into 
work on China’s potential low-carbon transition, there is a need to attend to power itself, which has 
been overlooked in much prior work on socio-technical transitions, particularly the MLP (Meadowcroft 
2009a; 2009b) and has only recently begun to receive attention in transitions studies in Europe (Kern 
2011; Lockwood 2013). Power has re-emerged as a key concern across many of the social sciences, 
and especially those that are roughly problem-led and post-disciplinary, such as development studies 
(Gaventa 2006), political ecology (Wolf 1972; Greenberg and Park 1994; Bryant 1997) and innovation 
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and/or science and technology studies (Stirling 2014).  Yet turning to power is not a straightforward 
step, since the concept and its definition is arguably one of the most unsettled, if not contested, issues 
in the social sciences. Hindess (2006: 1) notes, ‘there is little of value to be said about the concept of 
power as such'.  Yet, conversely, defining what we mean by ‘power’ is a gauntlet we cannot refuse to 
take up, for as Gaventa (2003:12) notes, perhaps the most common of ‘traps’ to fall into regarding 
such a move is simply to assume, and not to ‘define or address or use [it] in a coherent manner.’  
Beyond power’s ‘neutral’ and scientific meanings as causal power or capacity (‘power to’), its popular 
meaning as domination of some over others (‘power over’), or even radical conceptions (such as Lukes 
(1974)) that include its invisible exercise – preventing the powerless from recognising their own 
condition – is the notion of power as a matter of the constitution of social realities. Following the later 
work of Foucault (2004; 2009; 2010), who has been its foremost exponent, this perspective is 
concerned primarily with how power is exercised and itself constructed, rather than using it to explain 
its effects.  In this conception, society is constituted by power-laden social relations, that condition and 
enable or constrain specific forms of strategic agency.  These power relations are themselves mediated 
by various technologies, including forms of knowledge, measurement, procedure and practice that act 
as potential points of strategic leverage (Hindess 1996) and which may be studied in concrete detail.  
Such analysis thus elicits an understanding not only of governance but also of governmentality (the 
‘conduct of conduct’), a concept about which there has been considerable social scientific interest 
within the Chinese studies field (Dutton 1992; Rofel 1999; Yeh 2005; Jeffreys and Sigley 2009), but 
there has been little attention focusing upon socio-technical transition or low-carbon innovation in 
China. The aim of this project is thus to explore how forms of social rule and order are constructed out 
of diverse techniques and rationalities that manifest across whole social formations, and in forms of 
self-regulation and -construction, rather than through decisions located only in the citadels of states 
and corporations. 
In contradistinction to the other, more familiar concepts, power here is thus not analysed in terms of 
a capacity and its legitimacy (Hindess 1996).  Power in this view is not something that is seen as 
possessed in greater quantities by some than others. It is, ‘more appropriately seen as a kind of 
shorthand, a convenient (if not always helpful) way of invoking “the total structure of actions brought 
to bear” by some on the actions of others’ (Hindess 2006: 116, quoting Foucault 2001: 336).  Nor is it 
a priori normatively bad until legitimated by consent, but rather productive and normatively 
ambivalent, assessable only in concrete instances.  The reasons for preferring this conception to the 
others are manifold and the focus of a large literature that cannot be touched on here.  However, for 
our purposes, the primary reason for such a shift in the conception of power is that it allows for a fuller 
understanding of the issues of system transition.  In particular, this conception of power allows for 
existing (structures of) power relations, including situations of system lock-in, to be re-dynamized and 
so opened up in terms of exploring both how the existing system actively re-produces itself and thus, 
by contrast, potential strategic points for discontinuity and/or the emergence of new systems.   
Comparison with the MLP is instructive in this regard (Tyfield 2014).  While the MLP has been used 
successfully to analyse large-scale system innovations that have taken place in the past, it remains a 
persistent problem for MLP analyses to explain, or insightfully illuminate, prospective real-time 
transitions (Smith et al. 2010).  This is especially the case regarding the difficulty of showing how 
specific successful niches may be scaled up to effect a regime level transition.  For MLP, this is 
conceptualised in terms of the articulation or ‘alignment’ of the diverse social factors and forces, which 
the MLP rightly emphasises are involved, into seemingly coherent (and increasingly so) systems.  In 
conceptualising these simply as factors, however, there is no account of how these somehow 
aggregate into new wholes.  Moreover, the factors themselves must be treated as atoms, qualitatively 
unchanging, at least for the sake of the analysis.  This problem is particularly clear when considering 
prospects for low-carbon transition in China, where the elements at play in constructing an emergent 
system change rapidly in a complex process of mutual adaptation and antagonism. 
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Conversely, a relational, dispersed, productive conception of power directly furnishes a concept on 
which to hang the explanation of how a system transition emerges and without ruling out qualitative 
change in these ‘factors’, i.e. as new forms of productive power emerge via new power-technologies 
and dynamic, strategic power relations, in turn driving the formation of both new socio-technological 
assemblages and the parallel transformations in political coalitions, governmental institutions, 
subjectivities etc.  Both the potential ruptures and openings in the existing lock-in and a process of 
positive feedback loops in which peripheral niches may become powerful, ultimately challenging 
system lock-in, are thus presented.  In short, socio-technical system transition is understood (and 
understandable) as a transition in systems of power-relations, as a power transition. 
Moreover, innovation, itself conceived as a socio-technical system process of new-world-making, co-
produced with the socially and culturally-conditioned reception and consumption of new offerings (not 
just their technical development), thereby becomes a key window into this recursive process.  In 
adopting a dynamic conception of power in our study of prospective system innovations, we are 
therefore required to study what are (or are not) emerging as particular framings of ‘the problem’, 
here of low-carbon transition, and the ‘governance processes and architectures [that are becoming] 
mutually supporting and interlocked’ (Leach et al. 2010: 370). 
Further, the role of the ‘landscape’ level in MLP theory (including structural and governance contexts 
within which the regime exists) and its interaction with regime and niches is under-developed in terms 
of power. Major changes in the ‘landscape’ may be conceptualised as leading to specific ‘windows of 
opportunity’ for system change, affecting a disruption that specific niches could take advantage of. Yet 
the causation in this case remains one way, from landscape to regime levels. In the case of China, 
particularly, it is an open question whether what is additionally in play is the opposite process, by which 
the accumulation of diverse niches, and shifts in socio-technical regimes may seed profound 
‘landscape’-level change, in particular, the relationships between various state and non-state actors, 
and the role of users of technologies within a rapidly-changing socio-technical and political context. 
While there has been little theorisation in this area (though see Perez 2002, Cf. Tyfield 2012: Chapter 
15), we might speculate that such landscape level changes could potentially open local, regional or 
national systems up to more diverse pathways of change imagined. Not through the high-tech lens of 
‘indigenous innovation’, but through an alternative view of China’s low-carbon transition that 
encompasses shifts in socio-political structures.  
This question in turn opens up the qualitative, normative dimensions of socio-technical transitions and 
pathways, overlooked in conventional MLP analysis. These include the ‘3Ds’ (Stirling 2009): direction 
of innovation (or pathway) trajectories; the distribution of costs, benefits and risks associated with 
these pathways; and the diversity of pathways, including those that are locally appropriate and 
emergent, rather than nationally or globally imposed. Whether through high-tech, government-driven 
approaches or more bottom-up, emergent forms of innovation, China’s particular trajectory may well 
have global consequences in the medium-term for the qualitative nature of low-carbon societies. Low-
carbon innovation in China thus raises key issues for understanding the politics and sociology of moving 
to a post-carbon ‘economy-and-society’ (Giddens 2010; Urry 2011; Newell and Paterson 2011). 
4.3. Practices 
Second, it is necessary to recognise that supporting industrial innovation and introducing new 
technologies is one element in a broader socio-technical transition that must incorporate social 
practices, norms, infrastructures, techno-scientific knowledge, networks and symbolic meanings (e.g. 
Geels 2002; Geels 2005). Most analysis of low-carbon innovation in China focuses upon issues of 
production and the supply side (including analyses of data on patents, R&D expenditure etc.). The 
demand side, the reception and consumption of innovations (Bhidé 2009) including changes in 
associated social practices (Shove and Walker 2007; Büscher et al. 2011), is largely neglected (and not 
just in industries, such as solar PV, that were until recently overwhelmingly for export). This is true 
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even of more rigorous scholarship that focuses on learning and innovation capabilities in specific 
sectors of low-carbon significance (Watson et al. 2011; Simon 2011; Segal 2010; Lema and Lema 2012; 
Jakobson 2007).  
As outlined in some of the theories of socio-technical transition discussed above, changing markets, 
user preferences and practices are central in enabling transitions to more sustainable systems. Whilst 
governments have attempted to foster behavioural change through public information/education 
initiatives, research suggests that the link between attitudinal change and subsequent behaviours is 
subject to structural and institutional conditions (Ockwell et al. 2009). Social practice theorists also 
critique the notion that behaviour (and potential behaviour change) can be understood as rational, 
cognitive individual processes, highlighting how practices are social, habitual or routinised, 
systemically-situated and performative. These insights are vital in order to understand the complex 
ways that social practices develop or disappear, as in the growth of daily laundering (Shove and Walker 
2010) or different forms of shopping and eating (Southerton et al. 2011). They also help to develop 
understanding of the culturally-embedded framings through which different socio-technical pathways 
are viewed and experienced by different users (Banister et al. 2012, on competing theories of how to 
reduce the impact of transport).  
Such an approach sees social practices as not only mediating many of the relationships between the 
elements in socio-technical transitions, but as ordering and shaping the interactions between them.  
Thus reconfiguring practices around a particular technology can actually lead to changes in other 
interlocking habits, opening up opportunities for new innovations to emerge and play a reinforcing or 
steering role in niche or pathway development.   
Shove and Walker (2010) note, for example, how the weekday congestion charge introduced in London 
in 2003 led to a shift in the timing of visits to friends and relatives to outside charging hours (such as 
weekends). And they point to the limitations of the MLP in how to ‘govern practices’.  With such 
routines changing rapidly alongside most other aspects of social life in China, adopting ‘practices’ as a 
specific lens becomes a promising way to understand the associated socio-technical change, especially 
insofar as this is analysed as a key element of contemporary and changing power relations (cf. Shove 
and Walker 2010).  
Drawing attention away from the supply side also prevents a limited view of transitions centred around 
particular technologies (e.g. battery electric vehicles or solar water heaters) and creates space for 
more interconnected niches (e.g. networked, multimodal mobility systems including car sharing, 
bicycles; mini-grids based on solar PV, etc.) to be the focus of study. Recognising the multiple factors 
involved in transitions, and in particular how the reception of new innovations can influence social 
practices, also highlights the importance of less high-profile, more bottom-up innovations that may be 
disruptive, originating in China as low-cost, ‘below-the-radar’ innovation (Zeng and Williamson 2007 
Breznitz and Murphree 2011; Kaplinsky 2011; Tyfield et al. 2010).   The project will, through attending 
to user perspectives and practices, provide a more robust basis for understanding the potential of 
these disruptive innovations, the pathways through which they might emerge, and the role played by 
policy, politics and power in organising the ‘demand side’ of potential low-carbon transitions. 
Considering ‘politics’ and ‘practice’ together brings out important links. Questions around the potential 
for China not only to drive low-carbon innovation but also to foster broader transitions warrant 
significant research effort.  How does the central authority of the state extend to the diversity of actors 
involved in wider system change, brought about and enabled by multiple forms of innovation?  Does 
the groundswell of bottom-up and disruptive innovation from diverse publics raise challenges that are 
particularly acute for a relatively hierarchical and fragmented authoritarian technocracy? How will 
shifts away from current governance conditions, potentially opened up by the increasing engagement 
of the world’s largest online population (Yang 2011) especially in health, environment and 
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sustainability issues (cf. Thøgersen and Zhou 2012; Pew Environment Group 2013), change the 
processes through which state-level policies, strategies and targets can be translated (or not) to 
transitions at the ‘street level’?   
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5. Methodology and Case Studies 
Given these questions and reconceptualisations, we are led to the following research questions 
regarding low-carbon innovation in China: 
1. Are low-carbon transitions emerging in specific domains, where and why? Are they gaining 
significant traction? 
2. With what effects do they relate to broader processes of decarbonisation of societies as a 
whole and especially to the development of lower carbon social practices?  
3. What socio-political changes are emerging in China with implications for these socio-technical 
systems and social practices, and what are the implications?  
4. What lessons does China’s state capitalist approach to low-carbon innovation offer UK 
industrial policy for low-carbon transition and the generation of globally competitive low-
carbon industries?  
In both Figures 5.1 and 5.2, the model schematically describes the process of transition emergence as 
a strategic power relational process.  Bold arrows denote the analytical focus of the step, while dotted 
lines denote processes understood to be happening but which are abstracted from for the purpose of 
this specific step in the analysis. 
How can one conduct research to identify an emerging socio-technical system transition in which the 
future is not known in advance?  Deploying concepts of socio-technical systems and a constitutive, 
productive, relational conception of power, the challenge becomes, on the one hand, the exploration 
of how narratives, rationalities, techniques and practices shaping power relations are mediating self-
sustaining trajectories, with a growing ‘power momentum’, of low-carbon innovation in specific 
domains (Figure 5.1) and on the other, the potential impacts of these emergent innovations on the 
social elements constitutive of empowered strategic agency before and after possible transition 
(Figure 5.2). 
Figure 5.1: Two step analysis of emergence of a power socio-technical transition - step 1 
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Figure 5.2: Two step analysis of emergence of a power socio-technical transition - step 2 
 
These elements include political economy, consumer preferences and gendered social practices, 
cultural politics, and the evidence of new and changing power blocs, social identities and social classes. 
Put together one may assess the extent to which these elements may come to be assembled to form 
a new system and thus are enabling a self-sustaining and reinforcing dynamic not only in the context 
of but also actively responding to, incumbent structures, imaginaries and practices (Cohen 2010), 
hence generating a power momentum capable of, in time, challenging an incumbent system lock-in. 
What would be the methodology of such a project? To be consistent with our deployment of the 
concept of power described above, the goals of research here are not epistemic alone but political-
epistemic, in terms of trying to transform power relations. Moreover, this purpose is itself an epistemic 
imperative, for given the dynamic (Gaventa 2005: 19) of changing power relations, one comes to better 
understand it by engaging it, or its participants, at a practical level.  Such research is also both analytical 
and normative (Leach et al. 2010: 376), concerned with both the complexity of the problems under 
consideration and objectives of environmental sustainability and social justice (Leach et al. 2010: 370), 
but without presuming to legislate on what these complex goals mean in concrete.  Rather, as with 
other phronetic research (Flyvbjerg 2001) it is ultimately to cultivate the reflective understanding of 
the participants themselves (Flyvbjerg et al. 2012), specifically regarding the framings, truths, action 
and consciousness at work in, and formed by, current power configurations (Gaventa and Cornwall 
2006: 125: 127), and hence their own strategic positioning and enablement/disablement, especially 
regarding dominant framings and pathways.  The aim of phronetic research is thus not just to cultivate 
understanding of the research community (and the users of their research), but to contribute to the 
construction of such a reflexive, phronetic society. 
As such, phronetic research is different to action or participatory research, while having some features 
in common in that: 
it is it does not privilege collaboration with the people being studied as much as some forms 
of participatory action research; instead, it privileges producing knowledge that improves the 
ability of those people to make informed decisions about critical issues confronting them 
(regardless of whether that research is done in collaboration with those people or not). 
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(Clegg and Pitsis 2012: 73, emphasis added) 
Phronesis thus depends neither on a prima facie (and tacitly normative) privileging of distributed 
knowledge-making nor on a prior commitment to the normative project for/with which the action 
research is to be conducted.   
With these considerations in mind, we turn to the specific methods relevant to this research project.  
In each sector of inquiry – the three different but overlapping domains of agriculture, energy and 
transport – the research project turns its attention to comparison of two pathways. One broadly 
characterised by high-tech, centrally-supported and IP-intensive models of innovation, the other by 
dispersed, emergent, often user-led and lower-tech, usually lower-cost approaches.  Such comparison 
serves both methodological and theoretical purposes.  
Theoretically, it opens up the possibility that the most promising avenues for low-carbon innovation 
in China, in terms of effecting system transition there and overseas, may not be in the high-tech, 
proprietary models of innovation that are the overwhelmingly recipients of government (and think-
tank) attention.  Instead, we will also investigate the extent to which the already-identified strengths 
of Chinese innovators in lower-tech disruptive or below-the-radar innovation (discussed above) offer 
a different and potentially more compelling substance to the official discourse of 'indigenous 
innovation’ (zizhu chuangxin, 自主创新). 
Secondly, methodologically, exploring transitions in systems of power relations and the diverse 
technologies, including practices, through which these are mediated potentially opens up an unlimited 
set of issues with which to grapple.  To reduce this to a manageable research task, therefore, we deploy 
the comparison of the two innovation models, as these allow for the identification of pragmatically 
important differences between the two models that present a practicable set of aspects to investigate.  
This includes the identification of research participants, the range and number of which will be justified 
on the basis of concrete considerations regarding the social, cultural and political contexts and issues 
relevant to each of the three domains.  Across all cases, however, qualitative evidence will be gathered 
both through interviews and focus groups with top-down producers and bottom-up users of various 
descriptions. 
More specifically, then, in the case of solar energy (Urban and Geall 2014), the research project 
investigates:  
1. the centrally supported development of solar photovoltaic modules, a largely-export oriented, 
IP-intensive industry, in which China is now the world’s largest investor, producer and 
exporter; and,  
2. the production and use of solar water heaters, low-cost standalone systems of which China 
has the world’s largest installed capacity (REN21 2012).  
These pathways are interesting to study in order to understand better the differentiated dynamics of 
innovation diffusion at the global level and indigenous innovation processes around the development 
and widespread deployment of locally produced solar water heaters. A low-carbon transition in China 
will necessarily involve a shift from high-carbon energy pathways, and coal combustion in particular, 
so renewable energy is crucially important, especially where it becomes an industry valued for its role 
as a driver of growth, beyond sustainability concerns.  
China has become almost unquestionably the world leader in renewable energy, most notably in wind 
energy, solar energy (both solar PV and solar water heaters) and hydropower. China is leading the 
renewable energy field globally in terms of investments, production and installed capacity (IEA 2013). 
China spent US$67 billion alone in investments for renewable energy in 2012 (Frankfurt School-UNEP 
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Centre, 2013) and it is reported that it aims to spend 1.8 trillion RMB (£180 billion) in the five years 
between 2010 and 2015 for investments in renewable energy (Bloomberg 2013). While the initial 
development of the solar PV industry was mainly geared towards the export market, especially for 
Europe and the US – a situation that has changed since 2011, particularly in response to high US tariffs 
(Fischer 2014) – solar water heaters are predominantly used domestically with an estimated 30 million 
households as users (China Green Tech Initiative (CGTI) 2011). Chinese university-linked research 
institutes developed the unique Chinese ‘evacuated tube design’ in the 1990s and today it is estimated 
that 95 per cent of the patents for core technologies of solar water heaters world-wide are held by 
Chinese firms (CGTI 2011).  Esposito et al. (2014) describe solar water heaters as the ‘undiscussed 
protagonist’ for a transition from fossil fuels to low-carbon energy. Solar water heaters may have the 
potential to become a disruptive, low-cost innovation that could redefine household energy access 
and energy supply by making it more decentralised, individualised, independent, cost-effective and 
sustainable.  
Secondly, the project examines two potential pathways for low-carbon urban mobility (Tyfield et al. 
2014):   
1. the development of electric vehicles, specifically by Chinese-domiciled companies; and,  
2. the emergence and development of electric 2-wheelers (E2Ws), again specifically produced by 
Chinese-domiciled companies.  
The number of cars in China increased over 4-fold between 2004 and 2010 to 40.3 million (NBS 2011), 
with growth expected at seven to eight per cent annually (Sperling and Gordon 2009). This has 
consequences for climate change, pollution, congestion, high accident rates and rapidly rising oil 
consumption. American car intensity seems impossible in China as it would consume all of current 
world oil output (IEA 2011). The Chinese Government has identified EVs as a ‘key strategic industry’ 
with RMB100 billion (£10 billion) of support over the next 10 years, aiming to get five million on the 
road by 2020. Chinese car companies, more than those domiciled elsewhere, are focused on 
developing EVs. But EVs come with significant problems: they do nothing to solve traffic gridlock; they 
are only as ‘low-carbon’ as their electricity; innovation capacity for EVs in China remains heavily 
dependent upon foreign enterprise; and there is almost a complete lack of consumer demand for EVs, 
despite state subsidies.  
This is in marked contrast with E2Ws. China is already the world leader with approximately 120 million 
on the road by 2009. Moreover, at much smaller weights and not facing the same constraints of sitting 
in congestion, they make much more efficient use of (even conventional high-carbon) electricity than 
do EVs, substantially increasing their low-carbon credentials. Finally, the market is dominated by small, 
start-up Chinese companies, some of which have grown to large enterprises, using their own 
technology. E2Ws are thus potentially a significant Chinese ‘disruptive’ low-carbon innovation that 
may even come to redefine given social understandings of technologies including the car itself (Tyfield 
and Urry 2012), what it looks like, what it can do, how it is used, owned, manufactured and paid for.  
For this to happen, though, E2Ws must become part of various new social practices that move beyond 
the conventional car, which is increasingly necessary for mobilised social practices within rapidly 
growing Chinese cities (Urry 2013: Chapter 6). 
Finally, in the domain of agri-food systems (Ely et al. 2014), the project investigates two case studies: 
1. the centrally-supported development of genetically modified phytase maize as a potential 
component of intensive agri-food (including livestock) systems, and;  
2. the emergence of organic and agro-ecological approaches to the production and consumption 
of maize and associated agricultural products.  
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These two agri-food pathways are not only linked by maize, a key staple Chinese food and feed grain 
with a long and important history, but also by rapidly changing diets. This radically altered food system 
not only has climate impacts, but also requires innovation to address some of its key other 
environmental and social challenges, including food safety, food security and food sovereignty at 
varying levels.  
From the perspective of policymakers and scientists, innovation in Chinese agriculture has principally 
occurred in seeds, fertilizer input and livestock technologies. However, a greater attention to social 
practice reveals that there are other forms of innovation in Chinese agri-food systems, many in 
response to consumers’ changing practices: efforts such as green food labelling schemes, organic food 
delivery projects, community-supported farms, agricultural cooperatives or social movements around 
vegetarianism and other dietary practices. Therefore, the research considers innovation as it pertains 
to a low-carbon transition in Chinese agri-food systems, particularly in the context of a shift towards 
more meat-based diets.  
Our methods then have been chosen in order to explore these four questions across these six case 
studies.  Elmore described ‘forward-mapping’ as a strategy that, 
begins […] with as clear a statement as possible of the policymaker’s intent, and proceeds 
through a sequence of increasingly more specific steps to define what is expected of 
implementors (sic) at each level.  [It ends with a statement] again with as much precision as 
possible, what a satisfactory outcome would be, measured in terms of the original statement 
of intent. 
Elmore (1979: 602) 
Traditional implementation studies thus focus on the extent to which policy framings of technology 
development and transition are successfully imposed on users.  
By contrast we adopt a variant of a backward mapping methodology to compare and contrast differing 
framings/visions of system transition from innovators, consumers and users back to the visions 
elucidated in high-level regulatory/policy statements or company strategies. Backward-mapping 
adopts perspectives and practices of users/'street-level’ regulators as a starting point, and maps 
backwards to understand the disjunctures with regulatory/industrial framings at progressively higher 
levels. Employed in this way, backward-mapping aims to unmask user framings of technologies, the 
contexts in which they are encountered and the socio-technical practices associated with their use. 
This allows the analyst to identify inconsistencies, bottlenecks and irreconcilable tensions between the 
regulatory/policy framings on the one hand and the user framings on the other. This can often help to 
explain how regulations/policies succeed or fail.  Backward mapping has already been applied multiple 
regions and sectors in China by Adrian Ely, one of the project team, (Van Zwanenberg et al. 2011; Jin 
et al. 2011) and is well-suited to an in-depth analysis of system interactions, governmentality and 
practice theory.   
Here, though, to manifest the central concern with productive power relations and practices, backward 
mapping is not employed to explain the success or failure of politicies/strategies by presenting 
(whether to the ‘board’ or the ‘street’ or both) the ‘reality’ of the street-level reception in contrast 
with the top-down ‘image’ (Cf. also the contrast to action research described by Clegg and Pitsis 
above). The goal is not to assist efficient, or even equitable, policy-making specifically. Rather we aim 
to produce credible maps of how these all fit together in the construction of a (possibly emerging) 
systems of power relations, and specific roles and placements in that system which can then be 
presented to one and all, in order to furnish a phronetic reflexivity regarding such changing power 
relations; i.e. showing how low-carbon transition is/is not happening, the qualitative social dimensions 
of the resulting society and the strategic positioning of different agents in that ongoing process. 
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Dai’s (2014) work, whilst not adopting a backward-mapping approach, has attempted to identify 
differences between the interests of policy-makers and other actors at national and sub-national levels 
and offers lessons for our project.  Beyond interests, however, we will aim to characterise broader 
framings of innovation and transition, in particular to compare dominant producer framings for each 
case study with the actual reception and use of the respective innovations and how these interrelate. 
The former will be analysed through semi-structured interviews as well as (for triangulation, given 
understanding of the primarily practical, lived and political-strategic nature of what is being explore) 
site visits, discourse analysis of major strategy documents and, where possible, some extended 
observation. Evidence on the latter will come from interviews, focus groups, and extended 
observations of social practices related to innovation and use (Clegg and Pitsis 2012: 73: 75).   
The conclusions of the research using this set of methods, therefore, is what the participants 
themselves think should be done, thereby also creating impact in terms of leading them to think more 
reflexively on their own conceptions of their strategic agency and goals. Adopting a phronetic approach 
and in this way aiming to broaden out and open up social appraisal (Stirling 2008), we will present a 
set of transition pathways and the social and environmental futures to which they could potentially 
lead. These will have been shown to have both genuine purchase with significant constituencies 
involved, such as participants/informants, in the research process and to be analytically credible given 
the existing social power relations and their dynamics of change.   
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6. Conclusions: Tentative Findings and Implications for Policy 
As explained above, this project aims to fill various gaps in knowledge by offering in-depth analysis of 
low-carbon innovation and transition in China.  As well as advancing our knowledge and understanding 
of the Chinese case specifically, the project will offer insights into processes of socio-technical 
transition, and especially the roles played by politics, power and practice more generally. In addition, 
through adopting the backward-mapping approach outlined above with attention to user perspectives 
and social practices, it will progress attempts to research real-time prospective transitions and 
pathways of change.  Thus it will contribute to addressing key theoretical and methodological 
challenges in innovation studies, as well as adding significantly to the currently limited literature on 
(low-carbon) socio-technical transitions in China. 
Beyond this, the project aims to derive evidence that can inform policy and strategy in China, the UK 
and elsewhere. Data and analysis from the research packages discussed above will provide both 
general lessons and specific examples of policies that are – or are not – helping to build low-carbon 
innovation capabilities and the international competitiveness of associated Chinese firms, and to 
accelerate low-carbon transition.  In particular, the project will seek to provide insights that can inform 
policymakers and stakeholders in their search for low-carbon transitions that deliver not only 
environmental benefits, but fulfil social objectives around employment and improved wellbeing. 
Adopting the phronetic approach to research discussed above, the project will engage these 
stakeholders as participants in the project rather than as just research subjects, and will dedicate 
significant resources to communication and dissemination activities, including events to be held in 
Beijing, Shenzhen and London in early 2016.  These will create spaces for reflection, facilitate networks 
and learning between otherwise disparate stakeholders and contribute an evidence base for low-
carbon innovation policies within the UK (beyond the 2015 general election), China (beyond the 
Thirteenth FYP) and globally (beyond UNFCCC COP21 in Paris). 
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